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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN WATSON CHEVROLET, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
BUICK MOTORS DIVISION, 
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appellant No. 20000351-CA 
Priority No. 15 
ARGUMENT 
I. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
HAVE A LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS. 
Defendant, Buick Motors Division, General Motors Corporation, (hereinafter 
"Buick") addresses only the facts and legal arguments involving the specific principle of 
promissory estoppel and fails to even address equitable estoppel. Plaintiff has 
conceded that no promises were made to him that he would be awarded the Buick 
franchise in Ogden, Utah by Buick Division personnel. By failing to address the 
principles of equitable estoppel in its brief, Buick is apparently conceding that its 
conduct led another party, John Watson Chevrolet (hereinafter "Watson"), to rely on 
the conduct to his detriment which will result in damages if Buick is allowed to get 
away with its conduct. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Contrary to the implication of the defendant, there is no requirement in the 
principle of equitable estoppel for the parties to have a contract. Much of this dispute is 
a case of first impression for the court. The plaintiff cited the Restatement of Contracts 
for purposes of borrowing the logic from the restatement, not to in any way intimate 
that a contract was necessary between the parties. 
Defendant correctly cites Larson v. WycoffCo., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1981) but 
misused the concept. It is correct that the claiming party cannot rely on representations 
or acts if they are contrary to his own knowledge of the truth. Defendant would have 
the court believe that because John Watson knew that he was not guaranteed to be the 
appointed dealer in Ogden it was the only "truth" upon which he could count. Buick 
fails to consider that it is also a truth that Buick did not exercise its right of first refusal 
on the Warner/Nor da contract. It is also a truth that the defendant waived 
implementation of the all too nebulas Project 2000 requirements and it is a truth that the 
Buick violated its own policy by contacting another dealer behind plaintiffs back, while 
enjoying the fruits of John Watson's unique ability to get the Whetton TRO dismissed. 
John Watson did not fully discover the "truth" of what Buick had done to manipulate 
him and the Ogden market until depositions were completed. 
II. IT IS APPARENT THAT BUICK INTERFERED 
WITH THE BUY/SELL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
HELSO AND WATSON WITHOUT PROPER 
TUSTIFICATION. 
The reversal of the lower court decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 
2 
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Crivilli v. General Motor Corp. 215 F.3d 386 (3d Cir 2000) is not pivotal to John Watson's 
argument before this court. The well-reasoned opinion of the trial court in Crivilli 
supported the legal principles germane to this action. While the reversal of the trial 
court takes away relevant legal support it does not diminish the legal principles 
established by the Utah courts in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 
1982) because the uncontroverted facts show improper means coupled with improper 
purpose unknown to the Third Circuit because of its reliance on the Restatement 2d of 
Torts specifically rejected by Leigh Furniture and its progeny. 
In Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company vs. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). The 
Court said at page 304: 
We recognize a common law cause of action for intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations and adopt 
the Oregon definition of this tort. Under this definition, in 
order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) that 
the defendant intentionally interfered with plaintiffs 
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper 
purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff. Privilege is an affirmative defense, Searle v. Johnson, 
Utah 646 P.2d 683 (1982), which does not become an issue 
unless "the acts charged would be tortuous on the part of an 
unprivileged defendant/' Top Service Body Shop, Inc., 283 Or. 
At 210,582 P.2d at 1371. 
Even a casual reading of the Garove Deposition will show that GM schooled its 
dealers and made known to all applicants for dealerships its long standing policy that 
an application for a dealership would be evaluated on its merits and not in comparison 
with other prospective dealers. Under Buick's well-known policy, on which John 
3 
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Watson relied as a former Buick dealer, no other applications could be considered or 
even accepted until Watson was notified of Buick's decision on his application. The 
quote from St Benedict's Co. v. St. Benedicts Hospital 811 P.2nd 194 (Utah 1991) relied 
upon by defendant on page 14 of its Brief conveniently leaves out the additional basis 
for improper means identified initially in Top Service Body Shop, Inc., and confirmed in 
Leigh Furniture, 657 P. 2d at 308, and subsequently stated in St Benedicts, 811 P. 2d at 
201, where the means may be improper because they violate "an established standard of 
a trade or profession." With the Watson application pending, Buick went shopping for 
a dealer it considered more suitable without ever telling Watson why he was not as 
acceptable as Rick Warner and Ray Norda. 
The Third Circuit Court's opinion speculates as to the Pennsylvania legislature's 
use of the "reasonable" standard in the Pennsylvania Act, and concludes that it applies 
only to the contract between GM and its dealers. After reciting in detail the history of 
franchise contracts and the need for protecting the franchisee from arbitrary acts of the 
franchisor, the Third Circuit failed to recognize that the franchisee is already protected 
by the requirement that the franchisor purchase the franchise if there is no other buyer 
under Section 12 of the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Therefore, the use of the 
"reasonable" standard has little to do with the franchisee because the franchisee will get 
paid for the franchise either way. The requirement of a "reasonable" standard can then 
only apply to the purchaser from the franchisee to keep the franchisor from 
4 
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unreasonably interfering with the contract for sale. The reasonableness standard of the 
statute therefore specifically applies to prospective buyers because it is a non-sequitur 
to apply it to existing dealers. 
The Third Circuit was superficial in its view that the right of first refusal created 
two (2) purchasers for every offer received by the owner. It is a fallacy to conclude that 
a right of first refusal creates an open market out of which the dealer can choose the 
best offer. There is only one deal on the table and the franchisee has just lost the control 
of his voluntary sale to the individual of his choosing in favor of the total control of 
Buick Division. 
The Third Circuit attempts to create an invisible boundary between the right of 
first refusal and an unreasonably withheld consent arguing that the exercise of the right 
of first refusal is separate and distinct and can be acted upon independently from 
withholding its consent. However, the right of first refusal cannot always be used so 
independently. Buick's use of its right of first refusal as a tool to withhold its consent 
for the sale to John Watson became unreasonable when it brokered the Watson 
purchase contract to a dealer who had made no application while the Watson 
application was pending and in violation of its own policy. 
The defendant's right of first refusal as an independent contract right had been 
essentially emasculated by the circumstances in this case. Buick was selling no 
automobiles in Ogden, Utah because Jim Whetten had an injunction against the transfer 
5 
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of assets except though the regular course of business, but Helsco had closed its doors. 
Buick could not even proceed on its termination notice, initially because of the TRO and 
then due to the eminent bankruptcy of Helsco. In order to sell Buicks in Ogden, Utah 
defendant created an expectation that would induce John Watson to negotiate for the 
purchase of Helsco because he was the only person who could get the Whetton TRO 
dismissed. Simultaneously, Buick was negotiating with Henry Mixon, as an 
unauthorized representative of Helsco, to withdraw Buick's termination notice on 
Mixon7 s promise not to take Helsco into bankruptcy and give Buick time to recruit its 
favored dealer. Defendant sacrificed the legal integrity of its right of first refusal by 
using it as a tool to interfere with the contract between Helsco and Watson, withholding 
its consent and boosting Kent Peterson into the dealer chair by camouflaging the entire 
transaction in the guise of Project 2000. 
The Third Circuit accurately states, "[TJhere are legitimate reasons why a 
manufacturer would exercise its right of first refusal/' Crivilli, at 390. While there is an 
obvious body of case law supporting the legitimate use of a right of first refusal there is, 
conversely, the illegitimate use the Crivelli court failed to even acknowledge. 
The Third Circuit's view of an absolute contractual right of first refusal opens the door 
for a right of first refusal to be used for racial or gender discrimination or violate 
established standards of a trade of profession. Corporate solicitation and selection of its 
own choice to replace an existing dealer flies in the face of market economics and can 
6 
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obviously exceed acceptable social and professional standards. 
Further, there is a substantial body of law requiring that any justification 
asserted for interference with a contract, when exercised in bad faith, loses its privilege 
and the interference is not warranted. Determination of whether the interference is 
warranted is a question for the jury. Alyeska Pipeline Service v. Aurora Air Service, 604 
P.2d 1090, at 1093(Ala. 1979). 
The defendant quotes in its brief and the Third Circuit states 
Crivelli offers no explanation why the Pennsylvania 
legislature would turn away from the common law principle 
of freedom of contract and impose a reasonableness 
standard on aspects of a private contract between the 
manufacturer and dealer that, like the exercise of a right of 
first refusal, presents little, if any likelihood of harm to the 
dealer. 
Id. at 392. Plaintiff herein is prepared to offer just such an explanation. There is no 
actual freedom of contract present in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. The 
bargaining position between General Motors and the individual dealer is so unequal 
that the legislature has to modify the freedom of contract in such a way as to more 
nearly equalize the relationship between the dealer and the factory. Under the 
statutory protections, the dealer can sell at an acceptable price if the buyer can meet 
threshold criteria applicable to all dealers. The statute exist to protect Utah businesses 
from adhesion contracts in the sole control of a corporation's vast legal department and 
the misuse of those provisions. 
7 
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A prime example of a legislature willing to reject "freedom of contract" in 
exchange for a reasonableness standard is found in §320.643 of the Florida Statutes. 
Florida law prohibits the manufacturer from unreasonably withholding its consent and 
goes on to state as follows: 
For the purposes of this section, the refusal by the licensee to 
accept a proposed transferee who is of good moral character 
and who otherwise meets the written, reasonable, and 
uniformly applied standards or qualifications, if any, of the 
licensee relating to the business experience of executive 
management required by the licensee of its motor vehicle 
dealers is presumed to be unreasonable. If a licensee 
[]receives such notice.. .The department shall determine, 
and enter an order providing, that the proposed transferee is 
either qualified or is not and cannot be qualified for specified 
reasons, or the order may provide the conditions under 
which a proposed transferee would be qualified. If the 
licensee fails to file such verified complaint within such 60-
day period or if the department, after a hearing, dismisses 
the complaint or renders a decision other than one 
disqualifying the proposed transferee, the franchise 
agreement between the motor vehicle dealer and the licensee 
shall be deemed amended to incorporate such transfer or 
amended in accordance with the determination and order 
rendered, effective upon compliance by the proposed 
transferee with any conditions set forth in the determination 
or order. 
Id. See entirety of §320.643 attached hereto as addendum "1 . " Although not 
specifically applicable to this matter, the State of Utah has amended Utah Code Ann. 
§13-14-201 (l)(a)-(ee) (2000) since the acts in the case occurred. The amendments are 
instructive of the State of Utah's recognition that automobile manufacturers, including 
General Motors, present only adhesion contracts to their dealers and the dealers must 
8 
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be protected by the state law. Specifically §13-14-201 (l)(o) states 
(1) A franchisor may not in this state:.. . 
(o) fail to include in any franchise agreement the 
following language or language to the effect that: "If any 
provision in this agreement contravenes the laws or 
regulations of any state or other jurisdiction where this 
agreement is to be performed, or provided for by such laws 
or regulations, the provision is considered to be modified to 
conform to such laws or regulations, and all other terms and 
provisions shall remain in full force/' 
Id. The Third Circuit may consider such statutes as a rejection of the common law 
freedom of contract, but Utah does not. The Third Circuit failed to recognize that 
adhesion contracts prevent freedom of contract thereby requiring states to "interfere" 
by statutory provisions that provide some equity in the real effect of such contracts. 
The Third Circuit also fails to even consider the only real freedom of contract, the Buy 
and Sell agreement between the existing dealer and the purchaser, a contract where 
provisions are actually negotiable. 
Defendant suggests that John Watson cannot avail himself of the 
"reasonableness" protection of the Utah statute because it only applies to the existing 
dealer. However, the statutory prohibition against the manufacturer unreasonably 
withholding its consent to accept the prospective purchaser only concerns the dealer 
where existing management or a family member is the buyer; otherwise only the 
prospective dealer is damaged by the refusal because the existing dealer will receive his 
contract price from the manufacturer in any event. No one but John Watson has a 
9 
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greater interest in the outcome of the case because no one else was injured and an issue 
regarding an unreasonably withheld consent is unlikely to be raised by any other party 
including the existing dealer. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to recognize (1) that any justification, including a right of 
first refusal, is an affirmative defense that can be recognized only after a finding or 
admission of intentional interference; (2) the exercise of a right of first refusal made in 
bad faith cancels any qualification of a defense of privilege; (3) improper means and 
improper purpose, in combination or standing alone, are not defeated by a right of first 
refusal; (4) the Third Circuit's opinion in Crivelli ignores the adhesion aspects of 
franchise sales and service agreements specifically recognized in many statutes 
including Florida and Utah and assumes that Pennsylvania would legislate otherwise; 
and, (5) the right of first refusal can be exercised only consistent with and subject to 
public policy expressed in statutory provisions. Appellant concedes that they were 
remiss in relying upon other counsel in Pennsylvania and in failing to update 
verification of case law easily available to defendant as a party in other actions, before 
filing their initial brief and apologize to the court and counsel for that oversight. 
Regardless of plaintiffs oversight, courts should not hesitate to decide what is just and 
fair and morally sustainable in transactions where interference can be so easily 
manipulated under adhesion contracts and old statutes. 
10 
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Respectfully submitted this 8th day of January, 2001. 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
DAVID E. BEAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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s. 320.642 1988 SUPPLEMENT TO FLORIDA STATUTES 1987 8. 320.644 
Any other such opening or reopening shall constitute an 
additional motor vehicle dealer within the meaning of 
this section 
History - t 9 ch 70-424 « 1 ch 70-439 s 3 eh 76-168 t I ch 77-457 • • 
16 17 ch 80 217 99 2 3 ch 6l-3f8 ts 12 20 21 ch 68 395 
»Nott -Repeated effects October 1 1996 by t 21 ch 68-395 end scheduled 
for review pursuant to • 11 61 
'320.643 Transfer, assignment, or sale of franchise 
agreements.— 
(1) A motor vehicle dealer shall not transfer, assign, 
or sell a franchise agreement to another person unless 
the dealer first notifies the licensee of his decision to 
make such transfer, by written notice setting forth the 
prospective transferee s name address, financial quali-
fication, and business experience during the previous 5 
years The licensee shall, in writing within 60 days after 
receipt of such notice, inform the dealer either of his ap-
proval of the transfer, assignment, or sale or of the unac-
ceptability of the proposed transferee, setting forth the 
material reasons for the rejection If the licensee does 
not so inform the dealer within the 60-day period, its ap-
proval of the proposed transfer is deemed granted No 
such transfer, assignment, or sale will be valid unless 
the transferee agrees in writing to comply with all re-
quirements of the franchise then in effect Notwithstand 
ing the terms of any franchise agreement, the accept-
ance by the licensee of the proposed transferee shall 
not be unreasonably withheld For the purposes of this 
section, the refusal by the licensee to accept a pro-
posed transferee who is of good moral character and 
who otherwise meets the written, reasonable, and uni-
formly applied standards or qualifications, if any, of the 
licensee relating to the business experience of execu-
tive management required by the licensee of its motor 
vehicle dealers is presumed to be unreasonable A li-
censee who receives such notice may. within 60 days 
following such receipt file with the department a verified 
complaint for a determination that the proposed trans-
feree is not a person qualified to be a transferee under 
this section The licensee has the burden of proof with 
respect to all issues raised by such verified complaint 
The department shall determine and enter an order pro 
vidmg that the proposed transferee is either qualified or 
is not and cannot be qualified for specified reasons, or 
the order may provide the conditions under which a pro 
posed transferee would be qualified If the licensee fails 
to file such verified complaint within such 60-day period 
or if the department after a hearing dismisses the com 
plaint or renders a decision other than one disqualifying 
the proposed transferee the franchise agreement be 
tween the motor vehicle dealer and the licensee shall be 
deemed amended to incorporate such transfer or 
amended in accordance with the determination and or 
der rendered, effective upon compliance by the pro-
posed transferee with any conditions set forth in the de-
termination or order 
(2)(a) Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise 
agreement, a licensee shall not, by contract or other-
wise, fail or refuse to give effect to, prevent prohibit, or 
penalize or attempt to refuse to give effect to, prevent, 
prohibit, or penalize, any motor vehicle dealer or any pro-
prietor, partner, stockholder, owner or other person who 
holds or otherwise owns an interest therein from selling, 
assigning, transferring, alienating, or otherwise dispos-
ing of, in whole or in part, the equity interest of any of 
them in such motor vehicle dealer to any other person 
or persons, including a corporation established or exist-
ing for the purpose of owning or holding the stock or 
ownership interests of other entities, unless the licensee 
proves at a hearing pursuant to this section that such 
sale, transfer, alienation, or other disposition ts to a per-
son who is not, or whose controlling executive manage-
ment is not, of good moral character A motor vehicle 
dealer, or any proprietor, partner, stockholder, owner, or 
other person who holds or otherwise owns an interest 
in the motor vehicle dealer, who desires to sell, assign, 
transfer, alienate, or otherwise dispose of any interest in 
such motor vehicle dealer shall notify, or cause the pro-
posed transferee to so notify, the licensee, in writing, of 
the identity and address of the proposed transferee A 
licensee who receives such notice may, within 60 days 
following such receipt, file with the department a verified 
complaint for a determination that the proposed trans 
feree is not a person qualified to be a transferee under 
this section The licensee has the burden of proof with 
respect to all issues raised by such verified complaint 
The department shall determine, and enter an order pro-
viding, that the proposed transferee either is qualified or 
is not and cannot be qualified for specified reasons, or 
the order may provide the conditions under which a pro 
posed transferee would be qualified If the licensee fails 
to file such verified complaint within such 60-day period 
or if the department, after a hearing dismisses the com 
plaint or renders a decision other than one disqualifying 
the proposed transferee, the franchise agreement be 
tween the motor vehicle dealer ai id the licensee shall be 
deemed amended to incorporate such transfer or 
amended in accordance with the determination and or 
der rendered, effective upon compliance by the pro 
posed transferee with any conditions set forth in the de 
termination or order 
(b) During the pendency of any such hearing the 
franchise agreement of the motor vehicle dealer shall 
continue in effect in accordance with its terms The de 
partment shall expedite any determination requested 
under this section 
History —» 7 ch 80-217 » 2 ch 81-318 s 8 ch 84-69 ss 13 20 21 ch 
88-395 
1Note —Repealed etlecbve October 1 1996 by * 21 ch 88 395 end scheduled 
lor review pursuant to t 11 61 
'320.644 Change of executive management controf; 
objection by licensee; procedure.— 
(1) No licensee shall prohibit or prevent or attempt 
to prohibit or prevent, any motor vehicle dealer from 
changing the executive management control of the mo 
tor vehicle dealer unless the proposed change of execu 
tive management control of the motor vehicle dealer is 
to a person or persons not of good moral character or 
who do not meet the written, reasonable, and uniformly 
applied standards of the licensee relating to the busi 
ness experience of executive management required by 
the licensee of its motor vehicle dealers A motor vehicle 
dealer who desires to change its executive management 
control shall notify the licensee by written notice, setting 
forth the name, address, and business experience of the 
proposed executive management A licensee who re 
572 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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